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The Conditional Sale in Louisiana Jurisprudence: Anatomy
of a Synecdoche
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's ever-shrinking world has drawn many distinct legal systems closer
together, both geographically and politically. One ramification of this
development is the greatly increased probability of "importing" legal rules from
one jurisdiction into another.' Louisiana, even though obstinately a civilian
jurisdiction among states primarily ruled by the common law, is not immune to
this new reality. In the past, Louisiana's legislature and courts have imported
such common-law doctrines as the duty/risk analysis in torts3 and the property
transferral process known as the "conditional sale" in contracts.4
Since each legal system has a more-or-less complete set of legal
formants-i.e., sources and hierarchies of law-that influence the adopted legal
rule, difficulties in integration may arise in the importing jurisdiction. Because
the borrowed legal rule was molded in its native jurisdiction by the local
operative sources of law, once imported, the rule might not work as expected in
the importing jurisdiction. This likelihood is compounded by the adoptive
jurisdiction's own set of legal formants, which will interact with the borrowed
rule, sometimes undesirably. The implications and possible risks associated with
adopting external legal rules-in light of the systems' underlying, and sometimes
hidden, legal formants-have not been fully explored by Louisiana legal scholars.
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The almost instantaneous communication available today allows for judicial decisions to be
transmitted across the globe in a matter of days, if not hours. Legal libraries and computer-assisted
legal research networks make doctrinal works authored in one system readily available to jurists in
other systems.
2. The likelihood that a legal rule will be imported from one jurisdiction to another is affected
not only by geography but also by how closely related the two jurisdictions are. Although different
names are given by individual jurists, it is generally thought that there are three distinct legal
families: Romogermanic, Socialist, and Religious, each with its own offspring. See generally Ren6
David & John E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (2d ed. 1978). See also
Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana Civil Law Systems 199-212 (6th ed. 1991) and the sources cited
therein. Thus, it would seem that the membership of two distinct legal systems within one legal
family would increase the likelihood that there will be some borrowing of legal rules. On the other
hand, the importation of legal rules from a member of a Socialist legal family by a member of a
Romogermanic legal family is correspondingly less likely.
3. See, e.g., Dixie Drive it Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co., 137 So.
2d 298 (La. 1962). See generally Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive it Yourself vs.
American Beverage Co., 30 La. L. Rev. 363 (1970).
4. See La. R.S. 9:2941-2947, 3301-3342 (1991).
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Because of Louisiana's unique, and at times unstable, blend of legal
formants, the risks of importing rules from other systems may be even greater
than elsewhere. Louisiana's membership in a nation dominated by the common
law, the growth in the importance and the ease of trade with other states, the rise
of technology that makes doctrines and legal rules from all jurisdictions instantly
accessible, and the common background and history of the citizens of all states
intensify the temptation, and perhaps the need, to import legal rules and
doctrines. Too, given Louisiana's civilian tradition, there is a tendency to
borrow legal principles from other civilian jurisdictions. Accordingly, Louisiana
is a unique legal laboratory in which scholars are able to study the effects of
borrowing legal rules from other jurisdictions.
In the case of the borrowed legal rule of the conditional sale, in addition to
the essential differences between a civilian and a common-law jurisdiction, there
are other, even more fundamental legal formants that attach to every law which
is written or formed by judicial action.5 Because these formants influence the
legal rules without being an express part of them, integrating the imported rule
may lead to difficulties. This comment focuses on the unexpressed, yet
operative, legal formants that relate to the conditional sales contract in Louisiana,
namely Louisiana's codal structure, the role of the courts in determining the true
nature of a contract, and the weight afforded precedent.
While these legal formants are not express elements of the law governing
conditional sales agreements, they nonetheless influence and, indeed, can be
dispositive of many of the courts' decisions in this area of the law. Generally,
even the most exhaustive examination of the legal rules of each jurisdiction will
not disclose all of the legal operants within each system.6 An example of such
an unexpressed legal formant is when a law, expressed in one manner, is actually
interpreted differently. This is what Rodolfo Sacco has termed the difference
between the "operational rule" and the way the rule is understood. 7  The
5. See generally Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,
published in two installments in 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 343 (1991). Examples of legal formants that
almost certainly differ among the two jurisdictions are the two states' constitutions; other, non-
civilian, statutes; jurisprudential and doctrinal principles; and the weight the courts of the
jurisdictions afford precedent.
6. Perhaps the most influential legal formant that influences legal rules is that nebulous notion
of public policy. This notion exists and affects every court decision on some level, yet it is seldom
articulated. Parties to the case at bar frequently are uncertain whether the court will invoke policy
considerations and what that invocation will mean to the determination of the issues before the court.
7. See Sacco, supra note 5, at 9. For example, in Smith v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 366
So. 2d 1318 (La. 1978), the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted La. R.S. 32:1479 (1972) in quite
the opposite way the express law would commonly be understood. La. R.S. 32:1479 (1972) listed
three elements that were both the requirements for revocation of a habitual offender's license and the
prerequisites for the restoration of a habitual offender's license after revocation. The listed elements
were conjunctively joined. The court interpreted the "ands" as three "ors," citing precedent that
courts are not bound by the "niceties of grammar rules" when interpreting civil statutes and
attempting to discover the "'true meaning of the law."' Smith, 366 So. 2d at 1320 (citation omitted).
Following Smith, the legislature amended the statute to make it clear that "and" meant "and." In
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difference between the declaimed operational rule and the way the rule is
understood and implemented is one impetus creating a synecdoche.8
A legal synecdoche exists when the whole of a rule of law is expressed by
reference to only a part of it. The definition-drawn from the notion of the
synecdoche as a literary form of ancient Greek poetry-illustrates a form of
incompleteness of legal rules characterized by reliance on unspoken, yet
operative, legal elements within the system. In situations of this kind, the
formulation of the rule resembles (in form) the use of a synecdoche in ancient
poetry, where the passage of a long period of time might be described by stating,
"Many springs have passed." In this case, the whole (many years) is referred to
by only a part (many springs). The unexpressed, yet essential, part of the
concept remains unspoken. 9 The truth of the statement, "many springs have
passed," is undisputed, but more than just the springs have passed-so, too, have
summers, falls, and winters.
Barron v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 397 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d
1188 (1981), the court of appeal recognized the legislative overruling of the Louisiana Supreme
Court's interpretation in Smith.
8. The notion of a synecdoche is the product of European comparative legal scholars. See in
the English language, Sacco, supra note 5; Francesco Parisi, Liability for Negligence and Judicial
Discretion 19-22, 173-77 (1992). And, for those who read Italian, see Gino Gorla, Esperienza
Scientifica: Diritto Comparato, Cinquant'Anni di Esperienza Giuridica in Italia (Acts of the
Conference held in Messina-Taormina, November 3-8 (1981); P.G. Monateri, La Sinneddoche (1984);
and P. Gallo, L'Elemento Oggettivo del Tort of Negligence: Indagine sui Limiti della ResponsabilitA
Delittuale per Negligence nei Paesi di Common Law (1988). The 1979 Congress of the Italian
Association of Comparative Law and the 1987 Journe of the Association Henri Capitant examine
this concept in some detail.
9. For an example of a legal synecdoche in Louisiana, one can look to La. Civ. Code art. 2315,
which expressly contains only three elements to establish a cause of action in tort: fault, causation,
and damage. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 states, in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." There is no express legislation that
imposes a duty on a tortfeasor to refrain from causing the damage through his fault. Nevertheless,
duty is an integral part of a cause of action under article 2315. See generally William L. Crowe, Sr.,
The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been Influenced by Malone-A
Primer. 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903 (1976). It might be argued that the synecdoche is "cured" by
subsequent case-law, doctrinal works, and a consistent teaching of duty as a required element of a
cause of action in tort. Even though the legislation does not require such an element, every
practicing attorney is aware of the requirement through his education, reading, and practice. But,
since duty was not first a part of the positive law, there are ever-conflicting opinions as to what duty
is, where it comes from, and to whom it applies. The adoption of the element of duty as part of a
cause of action under Article 2315 makes this cause of action seem similar to a cause of action under
Germany's Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGBI § 823 (Walter Loewy trans., The Boston Book Co. 1909),
which enumerates which interests are protected: "One, who designedly or negligently injures life,
body, health, freedom, the property or any right of another is bound to indemnify the other for the
injury arising therefrom." Monateri, supra note 8, at 481, discusses this issue with reference to the
French C. Civ. art. 1382, the forbearer of our own article 2315. See also Parisi, supra note 8, at 323-




To avoid difficulties in coordination or uncertainty in application of the
imported rule in the existing legal framework, law-makers anticipating adopting
the rule must carefully examine all the relevant formants to determine the two
systems' compatibility in the area of the law affected by the contemplated
addition. It is possible, as in the case of protected and unprotected interests in
the area of torts, that what is hidden in one jurisdiction might be express in
another.'0 Examining the jurisdictions' underlying legal formants for compati-
bility will greatly increase, though not guarantee, the chances for a successful
incorporation of the rule.
The different, and often conflicting, legal formants in the jurisdictions have
made the integration of the common-law notion of the conditional sale a difficult
one in Louisiana's civilian jurisdiction. This is not to say that the existence of
unspoken elements of a rule of law is the sole reason for those problems of
incorporation in Louisiana, only that it is one reason.'
This comment's examination of this difficult integration will proceed as
follows: (1) a brief examination of the nature of the contract of conditional sale
with a comparison to the contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition and
to the promise to sell as distinguished from the promise of sale; (2) a more
thorough examination of some of the jurisprudence affecting the conditional sale
as that contract, in an evolutionary fashion, attempted to find a home in a
sometimes hostile civilian system; (3) an analysis of some of the possible reasons
for the difficulties in integration; and finally, (4) a modest proposal to avoid such
future problems in fully incorporating the conditional sale into our system.
1I. THE CONDITIONAL SALE IN LOUISIANA
A conditional sale is a contract in which "the purchaser pays the seller in
installments, and, although he receives possession and the right to use the thing
at the moment when he enters into the agreement with the seller, the seller
retains title to the thing until the final payment is made." 2  This kind of
contract is "a common law institution that has been traditionally unenforceable
10. See supra text accompanying note 9.
11. Following are some of the many other reasons for uncertainty in the law: a need for judicial
discretion in hard cases, the inherent imprecision of language itself, and an evolving philosophy of
the purpose of law. However, since each of the above is not an express part of the law, it can be
argued that each is itself a synecdoche. See generally, Parisi, supra note 8, for an enlightening view
of judicial discretion in tort law. See also Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics
of the Legal Text, in Legal Hermeneutics (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) and Frederick A. Philbrick,
Language and the Law (1951) for brief but insightful glances at law and language. See Law and
Philosophy (Edward Allen Kent ed., 1970) for a historical look at the philosophy of law. Some
would go so far as to say that law is utterly uncertain, and in fact-lawless. See generally Roberto
M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1.986).
12. Satil Litvinoff, Sale and Lease in the Louisiana Jurisprudence 111 (2d rev. ed. 1986).
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in Louisiana with regard to the sale of movable property."' 3  The so-called
"bond for deed" contract is the conditional sale of an immovable.
4
For our analysis, it is first necessary to distinguish between a conditional
sale and a sale subject to a suspensive condition and, later, between a conditional
sale and a promise to sell. The former distinction is necessary because of some
confusion occasioned by the similarity of their classification. The latter, instead,
is necessary because of the confusion caused by the similarity of function and
effect of the two obligations.
As to the first, the distinction between a conditional sale and a sale subject
to a suspensive condition is a clear one: a sale under a suspensive condition is
not enforceable until the happening of the uncertain event that the contracting
parties contemplate; conversely, in the case of a conditional sale, the seller is
obligated to deliver the thing, and the buyer incurs the obligation to pay the price
prior to the fulfillment of the condition." Thus, a sale under a suspensive
condition is not enforceable until the occurrence of an uncertain event, while a
conditional sale would be enforceable upon the consent of the parties as to the
thing and the price.' 6 As Justice Provosty concluded:
The reason why a sale under a suspensive condition does not
transfer the ownership is that it is not a sale. If it was a sale, it would
transfer the ownership; because a sale is a transfer of ownership, and it
is nothing else. The expression "to sell" and the expression "to transfer
property for a price in money," are convertible; and, as a consequence,
it is no more possible to sell without transferring ownership than it is
possible to sell without selling, or to transfer ownership without
transferring ownership, or to do any other thing without doing it. When
a sale is made under a suspensive condition, there is no sale until the
13. Id.
14. It should be noted that the statutory definition of the bond for deed states that the bond for
deed is a contract to sell. However, it has been demonstrated elsewhere that in a contract to sell, the
purchaser is not entitled to possession of the object of the contract until the contfact of sale is
completed, while in the bond for deed, the purchaser is entitled to immediate possession of the
immovable. See La. R.S. 9:2941 (1991). See also David Levingston, Comment, Bond for Deed
Contracts, 31 La. L. Rev. 587, 596 (1971):
[T]he bond for deed contract is defined by statute as a contract to sell. The purchaser
should thus not be entitled to possession of the property. Yet in every Louisiana decision
this writer has read on the subject, . . . there was never an issue pertaining to the
purchaser's right to immediate possession.
15. 2 Marcel Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law Part I § 375, at 217 (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans., 1959) (11 th ed. 1939): "The [suspensive) condition ... suspends even the formation
of the right. As long as the condition is still pending, one may say that the obligation which it
suspends does not exist; one has only the hope that some day it will come into existence." La. Civ.
Code art. 1767 states, in part: "If the obligation may not be enforced until the uncertain event
occurs, the condition is suspensive.".
16. See Agustin Cruz, The Validity of the Conditional Sale in Civil Law, 4 Tul. L. Rev., 531.
537 (Deutsch O'Neal & Agustin Cruz trans., 1930).
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condition has been fulfilled. There is merely a contract that there shall
be a sale when the condition is fulfilled.'
7
The second comparison, that of the conditional sale to the promise to sell,
is somewhat more complicated." It should first be noted that the promise of
sale can be either unilateral or bilateral. 9 If the promise is unilateral, then the
promisor will make an offer that, upon the acceptance of the offeree, forms a
binding contract, though executory only.2 °  The unilateral offer is not a
completed contract of sale until the promisee consents by accepting the offer, i.e.,
exercising the option. If, however, the promise to sell is accompanied by a
reciprocal promise to buy, then the contract is synallagmatic. In this case, as in
the adage, the promise of a sale amounts to a sale (la promesse de vente vaut
vente).2 If the seller refuses to uphold the promise, the buyer can sue for
specific performance. 22 Nonetheless, since the contract of sale is still executo-
ry, no transfer of title takes place at the time reciprocal promises are exchanged.
The contract exists in only two states: as a fully executory promise of sale or
as a completed sale. In the first case, the buyer is not entitled to possession of
the object of the contract, nor is the seller entitled to the payment of the price.
In the second case, the contract is one of sale, and ownership passes upon
perfection of the agreement.
On the other hand, a conditional sale exists in a single state between the
fully executory promise of sale and the perfected sale. Although transfer of
ownership is contemplated, it is deferred until there has been a full payment of
17. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 162, 46 So. 193, 197
(1908).
18. J. Denson Smith, An Analytical Discussion of the Promise of Sale and Related Subjects,
Including Earnest Money, 20 La. L. Rev. 522, 528 (1960): "The promise of sale, irrevocable simple
offers, contracts to sell, and sales have proved to be troublesome concepts [in Louisiana]."
19. The promise to sell is also called a promise of sale. But cf 2 Satil Litvinoff, Obligations
§ 100, at 182, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
20. The unilateral promise to sell is, indeed, an option.
A closer scrutiny reveals that an option is a-contact that actually contains a promise to
make another contract later. As that promise binds only the grantor-since the grantee
remains free to accept or reject-an option is or consists of a unilateral promise to
contract. When the promise is to make a contract of sale, if the grantee so wishes, then
it is possible to speak of a unilateral promise of sale.
Satil Litvinoff, Consent Revisited: Offer Acceptance Option Right of First Refusal and Contracts of
Adhesion in the Revision of the Louisiana Law of Obligations, 47 La. L. Rev. 699, 746 (1987)
(citations omitted).
21. Ambroise Colin & Henri Capitant, 2 Cours Eldmentaire de Droit Civil Franqais, § 516, 12
(Center of Civil Law Studies trans., 1976) (8th ed. 1935): "The truth is that the transfer of property
takes place at the moment of the double promise. The legislature wanted the formulas: I promise
to sell, I promise to buy, to be synonyms for I sell, I buy."
22. La. Civ. Code art. 2462 states, in part:
A promise to sell, when there exists a reciprocal consent of both parties as to the thing,
the price and terms, and which, if it relates to immovables, is in writing, so far amounts
to a sale, as to give either party the right to enforce specific performance of same.
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the price. Until then, however, the vendee is entitled to possession of the thing
and the vendor is entitled to the payment of the price.
The conditional sales contract's integration into Louisiana's civilian system
has evolved in several discernable stages. During the first stage of this
development, although some authority existed to the contrary, Louisiana courts
considered the conditional sale of movable property to be impossible.23 The
jurisprudential doctrine that the conditional sale of a movable was considered to
be an impossibility, while the conditional sale of an immovable was an
enforceable contract, reflects an early stage of the incorporation of the
conditional sale into Louisiana. The next stage in the evolution of this doctrine
occurred in 1934 when the Louisiana Legislature adopted the Bond for Deed Act
and thereby recognized this jurisprudential dichotomy in positive law. 4 The
final stage which will be discussed in this comment was the passage of the Lease
of Movables Act in 1985, an attempt to heal this schism by reversing the
jurisprudence and making the conditional sale of some movables an enforceable
contract.25 Each of these stages will be briefly examined by reviewing some
of the relevant jurisprudence of the period.
A. The Jurisprudential Bifurcation of the Conditional Sale
Early in the incorporation of the conditional sale, Louisiana courts created
the doctrine that the conditional sale of movable property was an impossibility,
whereas the conditional sale of immovable property was enforceable. In the
early case of Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co.,26 the issue
was whether a conditional sale of a steam shovel was enforceable. Justice
Provosty answered that question forcefully: "Such a contract appears to us to be
legally impossible. 27
The reasoning of the majority was that, since all of the essential elements
of a contract of sale were present, the contract was nothing other than a sale.
The essentials of a sale are: A thing, the property in which is
transferred from the seller to the buyer; and a price in money paid or
promised. Benj. on Sales, p. 2; Civ. Code, art. 2439. It follows from
this that to suppose a sale without a transfer of the property in the thing
which forms the object of the sale is simply to suppose an impossibility.
Either, therefore, the ownership of this shovel was transferred to Hoyt,
and the stipulation of continued ownership must be disregarded, or else
there was no sale made to him. The latter supposition is inadmissible;
23. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Comment, The Conditional Sale in Louisiana, 2 La. L. Rev. 338, 340
(1940) and the authorities cited therein.
24. 1934 La. Acts No. 169.
25. 1985 La. Acts No. 592.
26. 121 La. 152, 154, 46 So. 193, 194 (1908).
27. Id.
19931
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because not only the allegation is that there was a sale made, but the
plaintiff company has in its pocket a part of the price, and is not
offering to restore it.28
Thus, a contract in which the transferor was obligated to deliver the object and
the transferee was obligated to pay the price even while the ownership was
retained by the transferor was interpreted by Justice Provosty as an impossibility.
Since the contract as drafted by the parties was considered impossible, the
court examined the transaction to determine if all of the essential elements of a
sale were present, i.e., an agreement as to the thing and the price.29 Finding
that all of those essential elements were present, the court interpreted the contract
as being one of a completed credit sale.
Similarly, in the case of Thomas v. Philip Werlein, Ltd.,3 the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had wrongfully and fraudulently removed a radio-
phonograph from her home. The defendant had, through "self-help," entered the
plaintiff's home and repossessed the radio pursuant to the terms of a conditional
sales agreement. The court interpreted the contract as "one of sale which vested
title to the article sold in the purchaser immediately upon its execution." 3' In
accord with Barber Asphalt, the court clarified:
Where all the essential elements and conditions for an absolute sale
are present in a contract between parties, the effects flowing legally
from that particular contract follow, whether the parties foresaw and
intended them or not, and though they may refer to the contract as an
agreement to sell or as a conditional sale.32
These cases exemplify one jurisprudential trend adhered to when the courts were
faced with interpreting a contract styled as the conditional sale of a movable. In
these situations, courts, finding that all of the essential elements of a perfected
sale were present, interpreted the contract as one of a completed sale.
A second set of cases demonstrates another integrational problem with this
type of contract. In these cases, parties to the conditional sales contract would
use language to disguise the contract as one of lease so to avoid the consequenc-
es of having the contract interpreted as a perfected sale.
For example, in Byrd v. Cooper,33 the defendant bought thirteen mules
from one Matney, who had acquired them from the plaintiff. The plaintiff
contended that he had only leased the mules to Matney. Matney was under the
impression that he had purchased the mules when he gave the plaintiff six notes
28. Id. at 161, 46 So. at 196.
29. See La. Civ. Code art. 2456.
30. 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935).
31. Id. at 109, 158 So. at 637.
32. Id.
33. 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441 (1928).
COMMENTS
which reflected the full value of the mules. The Louisiana Supreme Court, citing
Barber Asphalt, held that the contract, although styled a lease, was a perfected
sale upon the parties' agreement as to the thing and the price."
A similar situation arose in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Pine Tree
Amusement Co.,35 where the so-called "lease" of talking picture equipment was
for a term of ten years during which the "lessee" was obligated to pay a fifty-
dollar annual fee for the license to use the equipment. However, the full price
of the equipment was fully paid in two years pursuant to the terms of the lease.
Prior to the full payment of the price, the vendee sold the equipment to the
defendants-who did not pay the annual license fee for three years. The plaintiff
sued to recover possession. Here again, the court interpreted the contract as one
of sale rather than of lease.36
These types of contracts resulted in the courts' adoption of a set of factors
to determine whether the contract was one of sale or of lease. As one author
illustrated:
The question of whether a contract is a conditional sale or a lease
depends upon the circumstances attending the transaction. Factors
tending to indicate that a so-called "lease" is in reality a sale are: that
the "lessee" is given practically all the rights of an owner; that the
"rentals" are large, represent the full value of the thing, and are in fact
intended as a purchase price; that it is reasonable to assume the thing
will be consumed or will have served its usefulness during the period
of the "lease"; that the contract contains a clause by virtue of which, on
default of payment of an installment, the entire price of the contract
becomes due."
These cases illustrate that, while there seemed little confusion that the
conditional sale of a movable was an impossible contract in Louisiana during this
period, when the contract was nonetheless entered into, courts were faced with
deciding its effects. Questions concerning the amount of rental allowed when the
contract was canceled were not consistently answered, nor were issues of the
nature of the contract fully resolved as ingenious merchants disguised the
contract using language of lease. These unresolved issues again appear in the
case of the conditional sale of an immovable, the so-called "bond for deed"
contract.
34. Id. at 405, 117 So. at 442.
35. 180 La. 529, 156 So. 812 (1934).
36. Id. at 533, 156 So. at 814.
37. O'Neal, supra note 23, at 342-43.
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B. Early Jurisprudence Affecting the Bond for Deed
In contrast to the conditional sale of a movable, the conditional sale of an
immovable, the bond for deed, was early accepted in the jurisprudence as an
enforceable contract.
An early Louisiana Supreme Court decision addresses the distinction
between the conditional sale of an immovable and that of a movable: "[W]ith
real estate the case is different; neither consent, nor delivery, nor payment of the
price suffice to transfer the ownership; there must be a deed translative of the
title.''38 Commenting on the reasoning of this court, Professor Litvinoff writes:
It is extremely difficult to find any basis for this distinction in the
language of the Louisiana Civil Code, and the lack of convincing
support makes the distinction somewhat incongruous. If, however, the
court had stressed that the reasons for refusing to recognize the sale of
a movable with reservation of title in the original Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. case were, actually, reasons of public policy, then inconsis-
tency and incorrect reading of the code articles could have been averted.
Quite clearly, there is no need to protect further either the vendee or
third parties when the object of the sale is an immovable: the public
records protect both .... Thus, policy considerations that might dictate
that the reservation of title be not allowed in the sale of a movable thing
do not exist when the object of sale is an immovable. This, no doubt,
is the true-and therefore the more convincing-basis for the distinc-
tion.39
Admittedly, the policy considerations alluded to by Professor Litvinoff
(presumably the difficulties with ostensible ownership) might well lead to the
conclusion that the conditional sale of a movable is an impossible contract.
However, these policy considerations provide no impetus for the courts to decide
that the bond for deed is an enforceable contract. Other policy concerns, such
38. Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 155 La. 459, 462, 99 So. 403, 404 (1924). See also Levingston,
supra note 14, at 587-600.
39. Litvinoff, supra note 19, at 116 (citations omitted). See also Levingston, supra note 14, at
597 (citations omitted):
It is submitted that the reason presented for differentiating immovables from movables
is devoid of merit under both the Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana jurisprudence,
other than those decisions cited above. In the first place, Civil Code article 2440
provides, in part, that a sale of an immovable may be made and consummated under a
private writing. When not confronted with a bond for deed, the courts have often
recognized this principle and have held that a deed translative of title is not required to
pass ownership. Furthermore, Civil Code article 2275 provides that even verbal sales are
capable of passing the ownership of immovable property provided that certain conditions
are met. Since a deed translative of title is not required for the sale of movables or
immovables, its presence or absence should not serve as a basis for distinguishing the
application of the prohibition against conditional sales.
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as the desirability of this contract to effect a transfer of wealth-which perhaps
would not otherwise occur-seem to be operative in this case.4 Regardless of
the reasons, the doctrine was created, and its application has caused some of the
same difficulties as the conditional sale of a movable.
In Trichel v. Home Ins. Co.,41 at issue was who bore the loss of a house
destroyed by fire that had been the subject of a bond for deed contract. 42 The
court distinguished the case at bar-which concerned the conditional sale of an
immovable-from Barber Asphalt and other cases dealing with the conditional
sale of a movable by finding that the parties to the contract contemplated a future
and final act, i.e., the delivery by the owner to the buyer of a deed translative
of title.43 Since no such deed had passed, the owner (rather, his insurer) bore
the risk of loss.
In Pruyn v. Gay,44 the prospective purchaser under a bond for deed contract
defaulted on the payments. Pursuant to a clause in the contract, the owner upon
default could cancel the contract and retain all monies paid as if they were rent.
The Louisiana Supreme Court supported its affirmation of the trial court's
decision to annul the contract as follows: "That the payments made shall be
considered as rental for the use of the property is not an inequitable or arbitrary
stipulation. If defendant does not comply with his contract, he should pay a
reasonable sum for his occupation of the property. ' '4 Thus, even though the
contract was not enforceable, all payments made under the contract were
forfeited.
In contrast, in the case of Heeb v.. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc.,46 the
prospective purchaser under a bond for deed contract defaulted on the notes.
The contract provided that, in case of default, the payments made under the
contract would be retained by the owner of the property as liquidated damages.
Interpreting that clause, and distinguishing Pruyn, the court stated:
40. For example, imagine the case of an elderly person recently widowed who needs to sell a
family home. If, as is often the case, the houseis an old one, the widow(er) might not be able to
find a willing buyer who is able to secure traditional financing. A prospective buyer who can secure
financing might well prefer to buy a newer, perhaps better, home. Imagine further that a prospective
buyer is unable to secure financing through traditional banking sources, perhaps because of an earlier
judgment of bankruptcy. The two needs coincide. In a case such as this, the bond for deed allows
for the desirable transfer of wealth in our society, a transfer that might otherwise be impossible.
41. 155 La. 459, 99 So. 403 (1924).
42. The Louisiana Supreme Court styled the contract a promise to sell rather than a bond for
deed. However, since the buyer under the contract had made an unconditional promise to pay the
full amount of the price and had taken possession of the property, this contract does not comport with
that of a promise to sell in which the owner is not obligated to give up possession of the thing, nor
the buyer obligated to pay the price. See the earlier discussion as to the difference between a
promise to sell and a conditional sale at supra notes 21, 22.
43. Trichel, 155 La. at 462, 99 So. at 404.
44. 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925).
45. Id. at 987, 106 So. at 538.
46. 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926).
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We agree with the district judge that the forfeiture clause in the
agreement was null and void because not warranted in law, was
arbitrary, unreasonable, and without consideration....
The law does not sanction the imposition of punitory or exemplary
damages by contract or otherwise, but only such as are in their nature
and character compensatory.47
The court affirmed the trial court's order for the return of monies paid under the
contract.
These cases illustrate that, even though the bond for deed was early accepted
as an enforceable contract in Louisiana, many of the same problems of
incorporation occurred as had with the conditional sale of a movable; e.g., the
amount courts would allow the vendor to retain upon the default of the vendee,
ingenious merchants disguising the contract in language of lease, and continuing
difficulties in determining the true nature of the contract.
C. The Statutory Adoption of the Jurisprudential Conflict
In 1934, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the Bond for Deed Act,4 8 thus
codifying the jurisprudential dichotomy. "A bond for deed is a contract to sell
real property, in which the purchase price is to be paid by the buyer in
installments and in which the seller after payment of a stipulated sum agrees to
deliver title to the buyer. '49 Since this legislation only affected the conditional
sale of immovable property, the same contract when applied to a movable was
still considered an impossible, agreement. Although it might seem that this
legislation would have dispelled some of the uncertainties in interpretation, the
confusion continued.
To illustrate, in Hines v. Dance,50 the second circuit, in determining
whether a contract which purported to be a sale but had many, if not all, of the
characteristics of a bond for deed,5 stated:
It [the contract] is not... a bond for deed contract under LRS 9:2941,
as defendant contends, because it does not comply with the statutory
provisions which require the contract to contain a provision to the effect
that seller, after receiving payment of a stipulated sum, agrees to deliver
title to the buyer.
5 2
47. Id. at 142, 110 So. at 179. Unlike Pruyn, the contract in the principal case did not contain
a clause that the vendor could retain payments made as if they were rental.
48. 1934 La. Acts No. 169.
49. La. R.S. 9:2941 (1991).
50. 460 So. 2d 1152 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
51. Included in the contract was a clause which allowed the vendor, upon default, to retain all
payments as liquidated damages, much as in the case of a bond for deed.
52. Hines, 460 So. 2d at 1154.
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The court determined that the contract was one of a credit sale rather than a bond
for deed, even though the contracting parties had intended the contract to be a
bond for deed.53
In contrast, in Gray v. James,5 where there was also a lack of statutory
compliance with the provisions of the Bond for Deed Act, the fourth circuit
stated:
Appellees argue in brief that even if the agreement fits the definition of
a bond for deed contract set forth in R.S. 9:2941, the parties did not
intend the agreement be a bond-for-deed. In support of this argument,
they cite the fact that the parties did not attempt to comply with the
statutory requirement for bond-for-deed contracts provided in R.S.
9:2942, and 2943. We are not persuaded by this argument.5"
Thus, in one case, statutory compliance was required; in another, it was not. In
both cases, the intent of the contracting parties was disregarded by the courts.
In Gray, the fourth circuit decided that the contract at issue was a bond for
deed, but the court treated the provision that all payments rendered to the vendor
be forfeited upon default more as a provision in a contract of lease than one in
a bond for deed contract-which is predicated upon just such an eventuality. In
a bond for deed, title is not passed until full payment of the price, and even if
all but one payment has been made, then under Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2944, the contract is in default and the vendor can foreclose, retaining all
monies.56 In Gray, however, the fourth circuit held that "where the buyer
defaults on a bond for deed contract after taking possession of the property, the
seller is entitled to collect reasonable rent from the defaulting buyer for his use
of the property during occupancy."57 This statement seems more applicable to
a contract of lease than to a bond for deed.
These cases demonstrate that the adoption of the Bond for Deed Act did
nothing to alleviate the uncertainty created in the jurisprudence relative to the
conditional sale of an immovable. As in the case of the conditional sale of a
movable, the question of the amount a vendor could retain as liquidated damages
upon the default of the vendee remained unresolved. Even after adoption of the
Act, courts were yet confused as to the true nature of the contract-sale, lease,
or bond for deed. Additionally, because of the courts' difficulties in formulating
a consistent doctrine concerning the effects of compliance with the provisions of
53. Cf. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cyress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
54. 503 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
55. Id. at 600. See also St. Landry Loan Co. v. Etienne, 227 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969), in which the failure to designate a bank as an escrow agent did not renderinvalid a bond for
deed contract even though this was one of the very few requirements of the Bond for Deed Act.
56. La. R.S. 9:2944 (1991) states: "T]he failure of the buyers to make payments as they fall
due, shall secure to the holder of the notes the right to foreclose when the notes become due and are
unpaid."
57. Gray, 503 So. 2d at 602.
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the Bond for Deed Act, after the Act was adopted, the statutory provisions
themselves contributed to the uncertainty in this already gray area of the law.
D. Recent Legislation and Jurisprudence Affecting the Conditional Sale of a
Movable
After many years of the courts' classifying the conditional sale of a movable
as an impossibility, the Louisiana Legislature, in anticipation of the forthcoming
adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted the Lease of
Movables Act.58 The fifth circuit interpreted the adoption of this act as
rejecting prior jurisprudence.
The "Agreement to Purchase or Sell" ... is a conditional sales
agreement whereby title is maintained in the vendor ... while vendees
... enjoy the use of the object through the terms of the agreement....
Although previously prohibited in Louisiana, this agreement is now
valid and enforceable under the Louisiana Lease of Movables Act, LSA-
R.S. 9:3301 et seq., enacted by Act No. 592 of 1985, effective July 13,
1985.' 9
Considering the difficulties in integrating the bond for deed into our civilian
system, even after the adoption of the Bond for Deed Act, similar difficulties
seem likely to manifest themselves as the courts face problems of contractual
interpretation of the conditional sale of movables after the adoption of the Lease
of Movables Act. A review of some of the decisions rendered after adoption of
the Act seems to verify this hypothesis.
For example, in Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co.,' the third circuit decided
that since the contract in question contained no provision giving the lessee the
right or the option to purchase the leased property at the termination of the lease,
the contract was a "lease agreement and not a conditional sales contract. ,61
58. 1985 La. Acts No. 592 (eff. July 13, 1985). Later amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 137, §
20 of that act provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this Act to amend the preexisting Louisiana
security device laws to accompany and accommodate implementation of Chapter 9 of the
Louisiana Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:9-101, et seq.) as previously enacted under Act 528
of 1988. It is further the intent of the legislature that these preexisting Louisiana laws,
including without limitation the various statutes and code articles amended and reenacted
under this Act, not be expressly or impliedly repealed by Chapter 9 of the Louisiana
Commercial Laws, but that such laws remain in effect and be applied to preexisting
secured transactions and, at times when so provided, be applied to secured transactions
subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws.
59. Blackledge v. Vinet, 543 So. 2d 935, 937 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
60. 524 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 1241. Note that the fifth circuit in Blackledge, 543 So. 2d at 937, stated that a
financed lease is a conditional sales contract sanctioned by the Lease of Movables Act. How the
court in Andrus came to the conclusion that a financed lease is not a conditional sale of a movable
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Nonetheless, the court decided that the provisions of the Lease of Movables Act
applied to the contract since the contract was a financed lease.62 This reasoning
is suspect because the definition of a financed lease includes the requirement that
"[t]he lessee is obligated to become, or has the option of becoming, the owner
of the leased property upon termination of the lease for no additional consider-
ation or for nominal consideration. 63 Since no such provision was found in the
lease, the contract could not be a financed lease. Later in the opinion, the court
notes that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3309 provides that "[e]xcept as
specifically provided in this Chapter, true leases are subject to Title IX of Book
III of the Civil Code entitled 'Of Lease."'" While this is so, if this is a true
lease, then why did the court expend its energy deciding whether the contract
was a financed lease? It seems that this court may be confused as to the true
nature of the contract, i.e., whether the obligation is one of a financed lease or
a true lease, the very problem discussed earlier in the context of the bond for
deed contract. As we have seen, this problem continued to trouble courts even
after the passage of the Bond for Deed Act, and courts faced similar difficulties
in like contracts affecting movables prior to the adoption of the Lease of
Movables Act.65
In another set of cases, the question of liquidated damages presented itself
to the courts. In Blackledge v. Vinet,66 the fifth circuit held that liquidated
damages, if provided for in the contract, were allowed under the Lease of
Movables Act. However, the lessor could only sue for accelerated payments or
cancel the lease, recover the property, and collect any liquidated damages
provided for in the contract.67 The lessor could not collect both accelerated
is
problematic. On the face of the act, it would seem, at least when the contract is a conditional sale
disguised as a lease, that the two concepts are indistinguishable.
It is declared to be the policy of this state to encourage and foster the leasing of
movable property to individuals and businesses, thus promoting economic growth and
development. To this end, financed leases, which have previously been construed as
conditional sales transactions, are hereby recognized as valid and enforceable in this state.
La. R.S. 9:3302 (1991) (emphasis added).
62. La. R.S. 9:3302 (1991) states: "[F]inanced leases, which have previously construed as
conditional sales transactions, are hereby recognized as valid and enforceable in this state ... "
63. La. R.S. 9:3306(12)(a)(ii) (1991). This lease was entered into before Chapter 9 of the
Louisiana Commercial Laws became effective (La. R.S. 10:9-101 et seq.); thus, those provisions of
securities law would not apply.
64. Andrus, 524 So. 2d at 1242 n.2.
65. See, e.g., Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441 (1928); General Talking Pictures Corp.
v. Pine Tree Amusement Co., 180 La. 529, 156 So. 812 (1934); see generally O'Neal, supra note
23, relative to the conditional sale of movables. See, e.g., Pruyn v. Gay, 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536
(1925); Gray v. James, 503 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); and Levingston, supra note 14, at
591, concerning the case of the bond for deed.
66. 543 So. 2d 935 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
67. See La. R.S. 9:3318 (1991).
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payments and recover the property." This is so because Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3319(C) provides that "[i]f the lessee pays accelerated future rental
payments to the lessor, the lessor must permit the lessee to remain in peaceable
possession of the leased equipment over the remaining lease term subject to the
lessor's rights under R.S. 9:3319(D)." 69 The court's reasoning seems unim-
peachable: if the lessor accelerates future payments, then the lessee must be
allowed the peaceable enjoyment of the property during the time for which he
has paid.
This, however, is apparently not the conclusion reached by the first circuit
in AT&T Information Systems, Inc. v. Smith,70 at least in a case where the
acceleration clause only required the lessee to pay part of the future monthly
rental payments. In this case, the contract provided for liquidated damages
calculated by the time remaining on the lease. In the event of default, the lessee
would be obligated to pay either seventy percent of the sum of all remaining
monthly payments or one-half of the total monthly payments from the origination
of the contract, whichever was less. The court held that the lessor could sue for
both the "liquidated damages" and for repossession, as long as the amount of the
liquidated damages, even if expressed as a percentage of accelerated future rental
payments, was reasonable.7
The third circuit appears to have arrived at an even more drastic solution.
In a case in which the parties stipulated that future rentals would be considered
as liquidated damages in case of default, that court found "that the parties to a
lease may stipulate that future rentals may be included as liquidated damages
under the new act for default in carrying out the obligations of the lease, and
such damages are subject to review only for reasonableness." 2
It seems, then, that if the acceleration clause is for less than the full amount
of the remaining term of the lease and is styled as liquidation damages, rather
than accelerated future payments, then, at least in the first circuit, the lessor can
sue for both accelerated future payments and for repossession of the property.
This result contravenes Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3319(C), which, as noted
above, requires that if the lessor elects to sue for accelerated future rental
payments, the lessee must be allowed the peaceable possession of the movable.
And in the third circuit, if the court finds that the liquidated damages are
reasonable, the lessor can sue for the full amount of unpaid future rental
payments. As noted in the case of the bond for deed, the question of the
contracting parties' ability to provide for liquidated damages seems to have
68. See also Campbell v. Pipe Technology, Inc.,499So. 2d 111, 114(La. App. 1stCir. 1986),
writ denied, 502 So. 2d 117 (1987).
69. La. R.S. 9:3319(C) (1991).
70. 593 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991). But see Campbell v. Pipe Technology, Inc., 499
So. 2d 111, 114 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (citations omitted): "[Tihe Louisiana Lease of Movables
Act does not allow a lessor to recover both the leased property and future rentals."
71. AT&T, 593 So. 2d. at 676.
72. Ouachita Equip. Rental Co. v. Simons, 443 So. 2d 762, 765 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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proved troublesome for the courts when applied to the conditional sale of a
movable.
Regarding a related issue, whether liquidated damages must be stipulated in
the contract before the lessor can sue for them, the court in Blackledge noted that
liquidated damages "provided for in the lease agreement" shall be awarded if the
amount is "found to be reasonable."" This seems to be in accord with section
3325 of the Lease of Movables Act.74 That court went further, however,
stating, "When the parties, by their contract, have determined the sum that shall
be paid as damages for its breach, the creditor must recover that sum, but is not
entitled to more."75
This conclusion seems supported by the language of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3325, but is not the position that the second circuit adopted in
American Leasing Company of Monroe, Inc. v. Lannon E. Miller & Son General
Contracting, Inc.76 In that case, the court stated that the lessor is entitled to
"recovery of only such damages as are found reasonable by the court, whether
or not those damages are stipulated.
7
The fifth and third circuits seem to be at odds over whether a financed lease
is a conditional sales contract, and, if so, whether a conditional sales contract is
enforceable in Louisiana.78 The third, first, and fifth circuits seem to disagree
whether, and to what extent, liquidated damages may be sued for if the lessor
also wishes to repossess the property.79
These few cases exemplify some of the problems that have arisen since the
adoption of the Lease of Movables Act. These cases raise issues similar to those
that continue to trouble the courts in the case of the bond for deed.80 For
example, difficulties in determining the amount of damages allowable under the
Act parallel similar problems in bond for deed cases. Perhaps confusion remains
as to the true nature of the contract. Since the underlying obligation is the same
73. 543 So. 2d 935, 938 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
74. La. R.S. 9:3325(B) (1991) states:
The court shall award liquidated damages to the lessor only if it finds the amount
thereof to be reasonable. If the court finds the amount of liquidated damages to be unrea-
sonable, or if there is no such stipulation, then the court may, in its discretion, award
liquidated damages to the lessor.
75. Blackledge, 543 So. 2d at 938.
76. 493 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 765.
78. See Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co., 524 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) and
Blackledge v. Vinet, 543 So. 2d 935 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 60 and 66.
79. See Ouachita Equip. Rental Co. v. Simons, 443 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983);
Blackledge, 543 So. 2d 935; AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 593 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991). For similar problems relative to the bond for deed, see Hines v. Dance, 460 So. 2d 1152 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1984) and Gray v. James, 503 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 50 and 54.
80. Cf. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (La. 1926) and Gray. 503
So. 2d 598, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 46 and 54.
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for both contracts, i.e., the transfer of ownership of a thing upon full payment of
the price, it is understandable that the same types of problems of integration
would arise upon adoption of both acts.
III. UNEXPRESSED LEGAL FORMANTS AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF THE
CONDITIONAL SALE IN LOUISIANA
As shown by the review of the cases above, there has been a great deal of
difficulty integrating the common-law doctrine of the conditional Sale into
Louisiana's civilian system. It was earlier suggested that some of the problems
of integration have been caused by unexpressed, yet operative legal formants in
Louisiana's system that are incompatible with the notion of the contract of the
conditional sale. This section will attempt to delineate some of those formants
that have caused the uncertainty in this area of the law. The comment will
single out three elements as operative in causing the uncertainty in the
jurisprudence: the Louisiana Civil Code and the underlying notion of codifica-
tion itself, the jurisprudential doctrine that determining the true nature of a
contract is the sovereign province of the courts, and an uncivilian reliance on
precedent. Each of these legal formants differs from the common law in greater
or lesser degree and has contributed, along with other legal formants, 8 1 to the
integrational difficulties reflected in the cases.
A. The Impregnable Barrier
The first and perhaps most important of the legal formants making the
integration of the conditional sale into our system problematic is the nature of
codification itself. Codifying the rules of law within a system assumes that the
lawmakers of that jurisdiction are able to state, as far as possible or practicable,
all of the general principles of the law. Once these principles are discovered and
81. Some of the operative legal formants that have not been mentioned are Louisiana's
allocation of risks between the buyer and seller, which differs from the common-law theory. See La.
Civ. Code art. 2467, which contains the civilian doctrine of res perit domino: "As soon as the
contract of sale is completed, the thing sold is at the risk of the buyer, but with the following
modifications." Contrast to U.C.C. § 2-303 (1990): "Where this Article allocates a risk or a burden
as between the parties 'unless otherwise agreed,' the agreement may not only shift the allocation but
may also divide the risk or burden." In the case of the conditional sale, part of the reason for finding
the conditional sale of a movable impossible was the inability of the contracting parties to divide the
incidents of ownership. See O'Neal, supra note 23, at 340. A second possibility is Louisiana's
overriding requirement of good faith in the performance of all obligations. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
Contrast this to the common-law notion of caveat emptor. In the case of the conditional sale, it
explains somewhat the courts' disallowance of liquidated damages in excess of a reasonable rent
when the buyer.defaults on a conditional sales agreement. While the Lease of Movables Act contains
this requirement, the Bond for Deed Act does not. In the common law, unless the damages are
unconscionable, the intent of the contracting parties, in accord with the doctrine of caveat emptor,
will be given effect. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990) and comments.
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articulated, those general principles are applied to the specifics of the case at bar.
However, once the general principles are written down, judges are forced to
apply them to new situations not conceived of when those rules of law were first
codified. The redactors of the French Code Civil, in describing how they
approached their work, explained this interplay of forces as follows:
A code, however complete it may appear, is no sooner promulgated
than a thousand unexpected questions are presented to the judge.
Because the laws, once written, remain as they were written. Man, on
the contrary, never remains the same, he changes constantly; and this
change, which never stops, and the effects of which are so diversely
modified by circumstances, produces at every instant some new
combination, some new fact, some new result....
The function of the law (loi) is to fix, in broad outline, the general
maxims of justice (droit), to establish principles rich in suggestiveness
(consdquences), and not to descend into the details of the questions that
can arise in each subject. 82
Unlike common-law jurisdictions where the law of sales developed from
individual cases, here the articles concerning obligations were positively
articulated from the inception of Louisiana's legal system. As the essential
elements of each nominate contract solidified in' the jurisprudence through
adjudication of individual cases, a judicial theory similar to the theory earlier
advocated by Planiol began to emerge: all possible obligations have already
been named in the code; thus little or no room remains for the formation of new,
innominate contracts. As Planiol noted:
According to traditional opinion, apparently universally received
because it is accepted without examination, the different special
contracts, which are distinguished the one from the other by their object
(sale, lease, partnership, partition, mandate, etc.), are of an unlimited
number and it is always permissible for individuals to invent new ones
whenever they find the occasion. That belief is not defensible, because
the specific elements which serve to distinguish the different contracts
82. Jean E. Portalis et al., La Idgislation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France 255-72
(1827), reprinted in Arthur T. von Mehren & James R. Gordley, The Civil Law System, An
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law 54 (2d ed. 1977). See also O'Neal & Cruz, supra
note 16, at 539 (citations omitted):
If the common law changes day by day, as new and different cases are presented to the
consideration of the judges, what happens with the codified civil law? Does it also
change gradually or is it halted until, being so unjust, it provokes a new codification?
The latter is without a doubt, the greatest defect of codes, that is, they fail in their
attempt to "establish a permanent state of law." Legislators are unable to predict all the
situations which may arise in the future, the customs change, society is transformed, new
interests arise and the code becomes an obstacle to the progress of juridical science.
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are not numerous and cannot be formed except in a definite number of
combinations. 3
Perhaps Planiol's notion that there is only limited room for innominate
contracts in French law has influenced Louisiana jurisprudence. The underlying
reasoning is not so far from the truth, in that the special contracts were so
numerous, covering seemingly all manner of possible contracts, that any
agreement must somehow fit within one of the established categories.8 4
As a result of this legal formant, one that does not exist in the common law,
Louisiana courts formed the doctrine that a conditional sale must be either a sale
or not a sale, without considering the possibility allowed for in the code that a
conditional sale was, in fact, a distinct, innominate obligation subject only to the
rules of obligations in general and conventional obligations.8 5
Because of this outlook, the Civil Code as interpreted by the judges in
individual cases became an impediment to the incorporation of this common-law
agreement. As one author noted:
In the common law, when the practice of merchants creates new
forms of contracts, the law will sanction them. However, in Civil Law
the situation seems different. The transmission of the title on perfection
of the contract, which creates the sale under contemporary codes, arises
like an impregnable barrier to the conditional sale. 6
The Civil Code need not be an impediment to the adoption of the conditional
sale. Rather, the Code embraces the notion.
B. The Search for the True Nature of the Conditional Sale
The problems surrounding the integration of the Bond for Deed and the
Lease of Movables Acts persisted because of the courts' insistence that it was
their sovereign province to determine the true nature of a contract.17  This
83. Planiol, supra note 15, § 1352A, at 767. In a footnote to this section, Planiol states that
"there are no innominate contracts in French law and there cannot be any." Id. at 769 n.2.
84. Some of the established nominate contracts are sale (La. Civ. Code arts. 2438-2659),
exchange (La. Civ. Code arts. 2660-2666), lease (La. Civ. Code arts. 2668-2777), rent (La. Civ. Code
arts. 2778-2792), annuity (La. Civ. Code arts. 2793-2800), partnership (La. Civ. Code arts. 2801-
2890), loan (La. Civ. Code arts. 2891-2925), deposit (La. Civ. Code arts. 2926-2981), mandate (La.
Civ. Code arts. 2985-3034), and suretyship (La. Civ. Code arts. 3035-3070).
85. "Nominate contracts are those given a special designation such as sale. lease, loan, or
insurance. Innominate contracts are those with no special designation." La. Civ. Code art. 1914.
"All contracts, nominate and innominate, are subject to the rules of this title." La. Civ. Code art.
1915. "Nominate contracts are subject to the special rules of the respective titles when those rules
modify, complement, or depart from the rules of this title." La. Civ. Code art. 1916.
86. O'Neal & Cruz, supra note 16, at 535.
87. Sadl Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48 La. L. Rev. 3, 12 (1987). While these two
elements seem quite similar, the "code as an impregnable barrier" refers to a judicial outlook that the
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doctrine exists in the common law, but somewhat differently than in our
system-at least in this area of the law. In common-law systems, this doctrine
is used to determine the true intent of the contracting parties. If their intent is
clearly to enter into a conditional sales agreement, then the courts will give effect
to that intent. Only when the contract is disguised as a conditional sale, but
intended to be truly a lease, are the courts required to determine the true intent
of the parties by interpreting the contract.
In contrast, Louisiana courts, because of the codal structure and the judicial
outlook that few, if any, innominate contracts exist, begin their inquiry into the
nature of the conditional sales agreement by examining the essential elements of
the contract itself rather than the intent of the contracting parties. Where all of
the essential elements of the nominate contract of sale appear in a conditional
sales agreement, then, in the case of the conditional sale of a movable, courts,
irrespective of the intent of the contracting parties, have held that the contract
must be one of sale. If, on the other hand, all of the elements are not present,
courts have held that the contract is an impossibility.
Unquestionably, the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code did not attempt
to establish general principles that could encompass all eventualities any more
than did the redactors of the French Code Civil. On the other hand, judges are
not free to depart from the clear language of the Code. 8 In the case of
obligations, Article 1916 provides that "[n]ominate contracts are subject to the
special rules of the respective titles when those rules modify, complement, or
depart from the rules of this title."89 Thus, where a contract has all of the
essential elements of one of the "special" categories of obligations (i.e., sales or
lease, etc.), the judge must treat the contract as such, and bring to bear all of the
provisions that apply to those special obligations.
The distinction between the essential, natural, and accidental elements of a
contract is an old notion.' Essential elements are those without which the
contract could not be formed. Natural elements are those that flow naturally
from the contract unless otherwise agreed by the parties, i.e., elements that are
supplemental rather than mandatory. Accidental elements are those that the
parties may add to the contract at their will. 9' In the case of the contract of
sale, in addition to the elements essential to any contract, such as consent, object,
and cause, are the essential elements of a determined or determinable thing and
codal structure excludes the conditional sale as an innominate contract. Conversely, the doctrine that
it is the sovereign province of the courts to determine the true nature of a contract does not exclude
the determination that the conditional sale is an enforceable innominate contract.
88. "When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search
of the intent of the legislature." La. Civ. Code art. 9.
89. La. Civ. Code art. 1916.
90. See O'Neal & Cruz, supra note 16, at 545-55 and the sources cited therein.
91. Accidentals would include such elements as the addition of a. resolutory or suspensive
condition. See O'Neal & Cruz, supra note 16, at 545-55.
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a certain price-required by the special provisions contained in the chapter on
sales.92 Natural elements would be such consequences as the time of delivery
or the warranty of the thing. Thus, the central inquiry would be whether the
transfer of title is an essential, natural, or accidental element of a contract of
sale.93
With this in mind, the Louisiana Civil Code establishes that a contract of
sale is perfected as soon as three things concur: "the thing sold, the price and
the consent." Therefore, the sale is perfect "as soon as there exists an
agreement for the object and for the price thereof, although the object has not yet
been delivered, nor the price paid."95 In the case of an immovable, "[a]ll sales
of immovable property shall be made by authentic act or under private
signature."9'
Accordingly, the conditional sale appears to have all of the essential
elements of a perfected sale. There is a written agreement as to the thing and
the price, although the price has not been fully paid. Upon perfection of the
sale, ownership passes, regardless of whether the parties intend to reserve title
until the price is fully paid. This explains much of the resistance to the
conditional sale as anything other than a perfected sale. As one writer noted:
In Louisiana, the vesting of title is the essence of a contract of sale and
is an element which cannot be contracted against by the parties.
"Divided incidents of ownership" subsisting in the buyer and seller are
not recognized. Where all the essential elements of a sale are present,
the effects of an absolute sale follow whether the parties intended them
or not. If a conditional sale contract is entered into, the clause
reserving title to the vendor is disregarded, and the effect of the
transaction is that the title passes to the buyer immediately by operation
of law. 9
7
Professor Litvinoff clarifies: "[I]t is the sovereign prerogative of courts to
declare the true nature of a contract irrespective of the name given to it by the
parties." 98 Thus, when a court is called upon to determine the true nature of a
92. La. Civ. Code art. 2464 states, in part: "The price of the sale must be certain, that is to say,
fixed and determined by the parties." La. Civ. Code art. 1971 states: "Parties are free to contract
for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or determinable."
93. It has been argued elsewhere that the "form and time of paying the price, as the form and
time of transmitting the property" comprise "the accidental elements." O'Neal & Cruz, supra note
16, at 565.
94. La. Civ. Code art. 2439.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2456.
96. La. Civ. Code art. 2440.
97. O'Neal, supra note 23, at 340-41 (citations omitted) (in part, quoting California Fruit
Exchange v. Meyer, Inc., 8 La. App. 198 (Orl. 1927), affd, 166 La. 9, 116 So. 575 (1928)). "[lIt
is now well settled that a conditional sale of movable property (as it is known to the common law)
is not possible under the laws of this state." Id. at 340.
98. Litvinoff, supra note 87. at 12 (citations omitted). See also O'Neal, supra note 23, at 341
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contract in the case of a conditional sale, they are faced with a contract that
appears to have all of the essential elements of a perfected sale. Faced with this
quandary, it is understandable that the conditional sale would be rejected in
Louisiana as "impossible." It does not, however, explain why the courts rejected
the conditional sale of a movable while accepting the conditional sale of an
immovable, the so-called "bond for deed.""
C. Jurisprudence Constante as an Operative Legal Formant
A third legal formant operative in the case of the conditional sale is the
uncivilian reliance by Louisiana courts on precedent. This operant largely
explains the courts' adherence to the dichotomy created by the courts (i.e., the
conditional sale of a movable as an impossible contract and the conditional sale,
or bond for deed, of an immovable as an enforceable contract). While this legal
formant is present, perhaps with even greater force, in common-law jurisdictions,
the approach is in disharmony with the underlying notion of codification and
constitutes a failure by the courts to adhere to the fundamental civilian notion of
deductive reasoning rather than the inductive reasoning prevalent in the common-
law courts. In Louisiana, legislation is a primary source of law, while
jurisprudence is a secondary source.'0° Thus, only after a search of the Code
should a court avail itself of precedent to help in determining the outcome of the
case at bar.
In a common-law jurisdiction, adherence to precedent lends certainty to the
law. In contrast, such adherence in a civilian system, especially if contrary or
unnecessary to the provisions of the Code, can have the opposite effect.'
Such rigid jurisprudence constante forces contracting parties to search judicial
opinions to understand the full ramifications of the obligation they are entering
into, rather than being able to fully rely on the applicable code or supplemental
(citations omitted): "But, the form of the instrument is of little import in determining the nature of
the contract; nor does the name which the parties give the transaction fix its character. The law goes
behind the descriptive terms used and looks to the substance of the transaction." See also O'Neal
& Cruz, supra note 16, at 559 (citations omitted): "If there exists a determined thing and a certain
price (or in money) and the consent of the contracting parties in regard to the exchange of one for
the other, the sale will be perfect as established by the Civil Code, and the requisites which the law
requires for the formation of contracts will be complied with."
99. Professor Litvinoff alludes to policy considerations for the dichotomy. See supra text
accompanying note 39.
100. "The sources of law are legislation and custom." La. Civ. Code art. 1. Comment (b)
clarifies: "According to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources
of law. They are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence,
doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may guide a court in reaching a decision in the
absence of legislation and custom."
101. See Duffie v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 563 So. 2d 933, 936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990)
(Watkins, J., concurring): "To stray from the clear codal provisions, as the majority has done, invites
unnecessary uncertainty into this already gray area .... Although a procedural case, the comments
of Judge Watkins are directed at the court's reliance on precedent rather than codal provisions.
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articles. In the case of the conditional sale, even a complete search of the Code
and the jurisprudence cannot fully reveal the effects or enforceability of their
contract.
This common-law methodology begins in the law schools, where students
take their first steps toward understanding legal issues by reading cases. The
practice continues as the students graduate and begin to prepare their cases for
court. Trained in the inductive method, it is not surprising that the first step in
the research process is a search of the reporter. From the cases, the lawyers
search for the rules of law the courts have pronounced and compare those rules
to those passed by the legislature. Once in the courtroom, lawyers argue their
cases before judges who listen sharply for precedent from their own circuit for
guideposts in judgment. The cycle perpetuates itself, becoming barely distin-
guishable from the methodology used in any common-law jurisdiction." 2
The early jurisprudence decided that the conditional sale of a movable was
an impossible contract. Rather than taking a fresh look at that obligation as a
distinct, innominate contact, or accepting the French view that the transfer of title
is not an essential element of a contract of sale," 3 Louisiana courts followed
those early decisions as deferentially as would any common-law court. Likewise,
when the court in Trichel v. Home Ins. Co.'14 announced that the bond for deed
contract was not a completed sale because there was no delivery of a deed
translative of title, the court did not explain how that distinction arose from the
Code, but rather began and ended its analysis of the law with a discussion of
prior cases. Subsequent courts have followed these judicial decisions with little
or no fresh evaluation of the Code's provisions.
IV. TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION
Analysis of these few cases illustrates some of the evolving problems that
have arisen since the importation of the common-law conditional sale-problems
similar in kind whether arising from the conditional sale of a movable or an
immovable.
With this in mind, if, as in the case of the bond for deed, the courts take the
position that determining the true nature of a contract is their sovereign province,
then similar problems will inevitably arise as did in the interpretation of the bond
for deed contract. For example, the fifth circuit's decision in Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Parish School Board of the Parish of St. Charles'0 5 indicates
just such an eventuality. In this case, at issue was whether a financed lease
under the Lease of Movables Act was a lease for purposes of the lease tax
imposed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:302(B). Stating that "Louisiana
102. For a discussion of this notion, as it relates to torts in Louisiana, see Parisi, supra note 8,
at 336-38.
103. See, e.g., O'Neal & Cruz, supra note 16, at 575; O'Neal, supra note 23, at 339-40.
104. 155 La. 459, 99-So. 403 (1924).
105. 597 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1316 (1992).
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generally recognizes the substance of a transaction over the form,"'" the court
held that for purposes of Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:302(B) a financed lease
was not a lease.'0 7 The question that determination begs is, if the contract is
not a lease, then what is its classification? It cannot be a sale because ownership
did not pass by virtue of the act. The contract, then, must be a conditional sale,
an eventuality not provided for when Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:302(B) was
adopted.
Neither will the difficulties in determining whether a contract is one of lease
or one of a financed lease be solved by Louisiana's adoption of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. As a result of its adoption, a security interest
(including one created by the retention or reservation of title by a seller of
goods) is to be determined by the "facts of each case." This section of the
Uniform Commercial Code lists several factors for courts to examine to
determine if a particular transaction is a lease or only creates a security interest.
These factors are similar to the judicially created factors Louisiana courts used
for essentially the same purpose.'0 8 This determination, using the guidelines
provided in Louisiana Revised Statutes 10: 1-201(37), might well militate toward
a similar uncertainty in the law as demonstrated in the case of the bond for deed.
The contracts most likely to engender uncertainty are those the parties term
a conditional sale rather than a financed lease. The Lease of Movables Act
concerns only those leases considered to be true leases or financed leases "which
have previously been construed as conditional sales transactions."' "°9 What
about the case of a true conditional sale, one in which the parties do not attempt
to disguise the transaction in language of lease? Will the courts continue to hold
that this type of contract is an impossibility? Here, as in the case of the bond
for deed, this need not occur because of a fundamental precept of the Louisiana
106. Id. at 588.
107. In a civilian jurisdiction, since most areas of the law are subject to a highly developed codal
scheme, it is not unlikely that a law imported from another system will interact with the laws
governing another codal scheme. While the principal case reflects the interaction of the financed
lease with the laws relating to tax, it is reasonable to suppose that in the future these kinds of
contracts will come into conflict with other provisions in the codal scheme. In Cosey v. Cosey, 376
So. 2d 486 (La. 1979). a bond for deed contract came into conflict with the provisions governing
matrimonial regimes. In this case, immovable property, pursuant to a bond for deed contract, was
fully paid for during the defendant's father's first marriage. However, because of some difficulties
not material here, the actual title was not delivered to the new owners until the father's second
marriage. Since, in terms of community property, the time of acquisition of the property is often
determinative of whether the property is community or separate (La. Civ. Code arts. 2338 and 2341),
and since ownership of an immovable does not pass until delivery of the title (Trichel v. Home Ins.
Co., 155 La. 459, 99 So. 408 (1924)), the property should have been classified as belonging to the
second community. The court, on rehearing, decided otherwise. Id. at 492.
108. See supra text accompanying note 37. La. R.S. 10:1-201(37) (1993) lists several factors
similar to those adopted by Louisiana courts to distinguish, "determined by the facts of each case,"
between a contract that creates only a security interest and one that creates a lease.
109. La. R.S. 9:3302 (1991).
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Civil Code: the recognized individual freedom to forge new types of contractual
agreements, the so-called "freedom of type.t
' 0
Although a conditional sale has all of the elements of a perfected sale, a
modification makes it distinguishable from the perfected sale: the parties' intent
that the ownership of the thing not pass until the full payment of the price. To
this end, the Civil Code states that the "[i]nterpretation of a contract is the
determination of the common intent of the parties..' Since the parties
intended for the obligation to be a conditional sale, the court need not inquire
into the true nature of the contract because "[w]hen the words of a contract are
clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation
may be made in search of the parties' intent.
' 12
Considering this, prior to the adoption of the Bond for Deed Act, the
conditional sale of an immovable or of a movable could have readily been
designated an innominate contract." 3 As an innominate contract, a conditional
sale, whether of a movable or an immovable, would be governed by the articles
applying to all obligations, but the articles of sale would not apply. This is
because a conditional sale is not a sale and was never intended to be a sale,"4
thus this contract is not subject to the special provisions governing sales." 5
Rather, a conditional sale is a distinct obligation, where the parties' intent is not
to transfer ownership of the thing until the full payment of the price. Nothing
in the Code seems to prevent this type of contract.'
16
On the other hand, the requirement that an obligation "cannot exist without
a lawful cause" cannot be ignored." 7 It is, in fact, the inquiry into cause that
has led the courts to search for the "true nature" of the obligation. Professor
Litvinoff comments as follows:
It is noteworthy that, in most instances, cause is the criterion for the
detailed classification of contracts contained in the Louisiana Civil
Code. Indeed, a contract is onerous because the reason that prompts the
110. Whereas the Louisiana Civil Code does not expressly state that such a freedom exists, as
the following discussion makes clear, the implications of several articles, read in pari materia, lead
inescapably to such a conclusion.
111. La. Civ. Code art. 2045.
112. La. Civ. Code art. 2046.
113. La. Civ. Code art. 1914 states, in part: "Innominate contracts are those with no special
designation."
114. The parties intend that a sale occur upon the full payment of the price, but do not intend
at the time of contracting that a sale be perfected at the moment of agreement as to the thing and the
price. Instead, they intend that ownership be retained by the vendor until the price is fully paid.
115. La. Civ. Code art. 1916.
116. See Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 166,46 So. 193, 198
(1908), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court curiously stated, "Nothing that is said in this opinion
abridges in the slightest degree the liberty of the parties to make such contracts as they please. But
parties can not make impossible contracts." See also O'Neal & Cruz, supra note 16, at 571-73
(remarking on this dictum).
117. La. Civ. Code art. 1966.
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parties to bind themselves is to obtain an advantage in return.... Al-
though the function of cause as a criterion for classification can be more
readily perceived in distinguishing onerous from gratuitous contracts, it
also operates in other categories."'
Even so, the Civil Code provides for the formation of innominate contracts.
Perhaps the reason there is so little discussion of the conditional sale as an
innominate contract is Planiol's notion that there is little or no room for
innominate contracts in a fully developed codal scheme." 9 However, even if
a conditional sale was not jurisprudentially considered to be an innominate
contract, upon the adoption of the Bond for Deed and the Lease of Movables
Acts, there seems no reason to deny those contracts status as nominate contracts.
In this case, the rules drafted to apply to those special obligation would apply.
When those rules do not respond to the issues under consideration in the case at
bar, the general rules of conventional obligations would apply. 20 Thus, unless
the general rules of conventional obligations and the special rules of the
nominate contract of the Bond for Deed or Lease of Movables Acts could not
resolve the issue before the court, there would be no need to refer to the
provisions of sale or lease, which, according to general civilian methodology, are
excluded from consideration of a distinct nominate obligation. 2 ' In contrast,
rather than rely on a fresh interpretation of the code articles in light of accepted
civilian methodology, courts seem unable to depart from their reliance on old
cases to interpret and classify the nature of the contract at issue.
If conditional sales were instead appraised according to civilian frameworks,
the inquiry would proceed by way of comparing the agreement forged by the
parties with the general provisions on conventional obligations and, descending
deductively, with the preestablished nominate models of the Civil Code. The
analysis would thus begin by examining the Civil Code obligations articles to
determine if anything about the contract conflicts with those provisions. The
articles concerning conventional obligations or contracts would next be examined
to determine whether they prohibited the conditional sale. Finally, if nothing in
the two general schemes prohibited the contract, the parties' intent would be
scrutinized to determine whether they wished to form one of the nominate
contracts listed in the code and supplemental statutes. If the contract does not
contain the essential features of any nominate contract, the court should abandon
that inquiry. Then, unless anything about the contract violates public policy, the
court would find the agreement to be an innominate contract and give effect to
118. Litvinoff, supra note 87, at 11-12 (citations omitted).
119. Planiol, supra note 15, § 1352A, at 767-69.
120. La. Civ. Code art. 1915 states, "All contracts, nominate and innominate, are subject to the
rules of this title." See also La. Civ. Code art. 1916: "Nominate contracts are subject to the special
rules of the respective titles when those rules modify, complement, or depart from the rules of this
title."
121. See La. Civ. Code art. 1916.
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the intent of the contracting parties. This methodology, while avoiding many of
the problems that have plagued the courts in the past relative to the conditional
sale, may help courts in their efforts to implement the Bond for Deed and the
Lease of Movables Acts.
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the legal formants noted above-the codal structure, the doctrine
that determining the true nature of a contract is the province of the courts,
Louisiana courts' uncivilian reliance on precedent, and others-are operative
whenever a court is called upon to adjudicate a conditional sales contract.' 22
Each of these legal formants are synecdoches in that they operate on that
obligation even though they are not an express part of the law of obligations.
Thus considered, as different legal systems are brought closer together both
in ideology and distance and as an increasing number of legal rules are imported
from one jurisdiction into another,' 23 it has become more important that the
decision-makers in the importing jurisdiction carefully examine the legal
formants in both systems to discover unspoken legal formants operative in both
jurisdictions. Such scrutiny might help avoid such uncertainty in the law as has
been demonstrated in the cases and doctrine discussed here.
Comparative law scholars would be particularly fitted for this endeavor by
their unique vantage point achieved through study of distinct legal systems. As
Professor Parisi states:
The thesis [that there are unexpressed elements of the law which
operate on the court] put forward by Gino Gorla and soon elaborated by
Rodolfo Sacco (and now thoroughly analyzed by a number of compara-
tive legal scholars) stresses the existence of unspoken-and yet
operative and, at times, immensely important-legal formants. Sacco
describes them as cryptotypes, implicit rules or unspoken patterns that
have outward effects. On the same theme, Gorla's analysis had stressed
the existence of a deep variance between the real ratio decidendi of a
case and the legal formula enunciated by the court in its decision. It is
the task of legal analysis-in this, comparative analysis enjoys an
advantaged viewpoint-to discover and reveal these latent
patterns. . 24
In short, it is the province of the comparative legal scholar to analyze other legal
systems to determine whether what is implicit in one system is explicit in another
and whether what is unexpressed in one is expressed elsewhere.
122. See supra text accompanying note 81.
123. For anyone who is not yet convinced of this, witness Louisiana's final capitulation to the
adoption of most of the Uniform Commercial Code.
124. Parisi, supra note 8, at 19-20, (citations omitted).
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With the knowledge of the possibility of the existence of synecdoches and
unspoken legal formants, jurists will be better able to confront the problems
inherent in the adoption of legal rules derived from different legal traditions.
Careful examination of the legal formants in both systems makes it possible to
identify and avoid the problems caused by unspoken yet operative elements of
the borrowed model. Such study could also reveal in the importing jurisdiction
a legal formant that would interact with the borrowed rule adversely. In either
case, this examination would facilitate the transition of the new rule into the
adoptive jurisdiction.
Huey L Golden

